On Ponzi schemes in infinite horizon collateralized economies with default penalties

DOI10.1007/S10436-012-0209-YzbMath1298.91177OpenAlexW2099741436MaRDI QIDQ470602

V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha, Yiannis Vailakis

Publication date: 12 November 2014

Published in: Annals of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/8430

zbMATH Keywords

collateraldefault penaltiesPonzi schemes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Credit risk (91G40)

Related Items (3)

Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: a counterexample ⋮ Recourse loans and Ponzi schemes ⋮ Financial segmentation and collateralized debt in infinite-horizon economies

Cites Work

• Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: a counterexample
• The impossibility of effective enforcement mechanisms in collateralized credit markets
• Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes
• Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1
• Stationary Equilibria in Asset-Pricing Models with Incomplete Markets and Collateral
• Collateral Avoids Ponzi Schemes in Incomplete Markets

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