Russell's Paradox in Appendix B of the Principles of Mathematics : Was Frege's response adequate?

DOI10.1080/01445340110112887zbMath1030.03002OpenAlexW2053229421WikidataQ58515345 ScholiaQ58515345MaRDI QIDQ4707465

Kevin C. Klement

Publication date: 16 February 2004

Published in: History and Philosophy of Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340110112887

zbMATH Keywords

sensereferenceintensional logicthoughtsRussell-Myhill antinomy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History of mathematics in the 20th century (01A60) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) History of mathematical logic and foundations (03-03)

Related Items (3)

Russell, His Paradoxes, and Cantor's Theorem: Part I ⋮ Structure by proxy, with an application to grounding ⋮ A NEGLECTED RESOLUTION OF RUSSELL’S PARADOX OF PROPOSITIONS

Cites Work

• Semantical antinomies in the logic of sense and denotation
• A Revised Formulation of the Logic of Sense and Denotation. Alternative (1)
• Some Difficulties Concerning Russellian Intensional Logic
• Outline of a Revised Formulation of the Logic of Sense and Denotation (Part I)
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