Strategic Models of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations

DOI10.2307/2298017zbMath0736.90084OpenAlexW2068533205MaRDI QIDQ4712946

Robert W. Rosenthal, Raquel Fernández

Publication date: 25 June 1992

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2298017

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect Nash equilibriadebt repaymentdebt renegotiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Economic growth models (91B62) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (4)

Equilibrium selection in bargaining models. ⋮ Birds of a feather: separating spillovers from shocks in sovereign default ⋮ A game theoretical approach to the international debt overhang ⋮ Strategic delay and endogeneous offers in bargaining games with private information

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