Representation of constitutions under incomplete information

DOI10.1007/s00199-014-0816-0zbMath1319.91072OpenAlexW2028407463WikidataQ57920634 ScholiaQ57920634MaRDI QIDQ471319

Shmuel Zamir, Bezalel Peleg

Publication date: 14 November 2014

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp634.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationBayesian Nash equilibriumdecision schemeeffectivity function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey ⋮ On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions ⋮ Channeling the final say in politics: a simple mechanism

Cites Work

• Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
• Binary effectivity rules
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
• Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
• Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
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