Sorting the good guys from bad: on the optimal audit structure with ex-ante information acquisition

DOI10.1007/S00199-014-0818-YzbMath1319.91103OpenAlexW2070110970MaRDI QIDQ471323

Peter J. Simmons, Anna Maria C. Menichini

Publication date: 14 November 2014

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0818-y

zbMATH Keywords

contractsauditingdebt contractex-ante information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

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• Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
• A General Characterization of Optimal Income Tax Enforcement
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable

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