Confidence intervals for the Shapley-Shubik power index in Markovian games

DOI10.1007/s13235-013-0079-6zbMath1300.91009OpenAlexW2053532392MaRDI QIDQ471433

Laura Cottatellucci, Lorenzo Maggi, Konstantin E. Avrachenkov

Publication date: 14 November 2014

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-013-0079-6

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueconfidence intervalShapley-Shubik power indexMarkovian game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

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