Adaptation and the allocation of pollution reduction costs

DOI10.1007/S13235-013-0085-8zbMath1300.91024OpenAlexW1977946689WikidataQ124925972 ScholiaQ124925972MaRDI QIDQ471435

Farnaz Taherkhani, Hassan Benchekroun

Publication date: 14 November 2014

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/03-2013-cah.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueadaptationtransboundary pollutionclimate changetime-consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (2)

Impact of social externalities on the formation of an international environmental agreement: an exploratory analysis ⋮ Games with adaptation and mitigation

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Dynamic games in the economics of natural resources: a survey
• Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
• Computation of characteristic function values for linear-state differential games
• Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction
• Cores of convex games
• COALITIONAL SOLUTION OF A GAME-THEORETIC EMISSION REDUCTION MODEL
• DYNAMIC GAMES WITH COALITIONAL STRUCTURES

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