Learning and technological progress in dynamic games

DOI10.1007/S13235-013-0089-4zbMath1300.91021OpenAlexW3122293566MaRDI QIDQ471436

Leonard J. Mirman, Marc Santugini

Publication date: 14 November 2014

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-013-0089-4

zbMATH Keywords

learningcapital accumulationtechnological progressriskinvestmentdynamic game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18) Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (2)

Strategic interactions in a one-sector growth model ⋮ Strategic exploitation of a common-property resource under rational learning about its reproduction

Cites Work

• Optimal growth and uncertainty: Learning
• Optimal growth with experimentation
• Growth under uncertainty with experimentation
• Learning and control in a changing economic environment.
• Bayesian economists \dots Bayesian agents. An alternative approach to optimal learning
• Strategic resource extraction, capital accumulation and overlapping generations

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