Do social status seeking behaviors worsen the tragedy of the commons?

DOI10.1007/s13235-013-0087-6zbMath1300.91026OpenAlexW2052758505MaRDI QIDQ471438

Sébastien Rouillon

Publication date: 14 November 2014

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-013-0087-6

zbMATH Keywords

differential gamessocial statuscommon-propertynonrenewable resource

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (1)

Cooperative and noncooperative extraction in a common pool with habit formation

Cites Work

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• Dynamic games in the economics of natural resources: a survey
• Characterization of Markovian equilibria in a class of differential games
• Comparison utility in a growth model
• New method to characterize subgame perfect Nash equilibria in differential games
• A dynamic game of status-seeking with public capital and an exhaustible resource

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