Probabilistic interpretations of integrability for game dynamics

DOI10.1007/s13235-013-0082-yzbMath1300.91012OpenAlexW1967569074MaRDI QIDQ471439

William H. Sandholm

Publication date: 14 November 2014

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-013-0082-y

zbMATH Keywords

decision rulesintegrabilityevolutionary game theorylearning in games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items

Riemannian game dynamics, Tributes to Bill Sandholm

Cites Work

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