On misrepresentation-proof strategies in incentive design problems

DOI10.1080/00207729608929300zbMath0860.90036OpenAlexW2000106099MaRDI QIDQ4717407

Chunhui Xu, Kyoichi Kijima

Publication date: 1 December 1996

Published in: International Journal of Systems Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00207729608929300

zbMATH Keywords

hierarchical systemsincentive designmisrepresentation-proof optimal incentive strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical systems (93A13) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Misrepresentation-proof strategies in poly-agent systems

Cites Work

• A family of incentive-compatible and non-subsidizing optimal resource allocation problems
• A control-theoretic view on incentives
• Existence and derivation of optimal affine incentive schemes for Stackelberg games with partial information: a geometric approach†
• Incentives in a Divisionalized Firm
• Incentive strategies dealing with uncertainty about the follower's MCDM behaviour

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