Symmetric play in repeated allocation games
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Publication:472178
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.08.002zbMath1309.91018OpenAlexW1523915399MaRDI QIDQ472178
Christoph Kuzmics, Thomas R. Palfrey, Brian W. Rogers
Publication date: 19 November 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/54785/
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