Free entry versus socially optimal entry

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.003zbMath1309.91088OpenAlexW2112453995MaRDI QIDQ472183

Rabah Amir, Leonidas C. Koutsougeras, Luciano I. de Castro

Publication date: 19 November 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.003

zbMATH Keywords

supermodularityCournot oligopolyentry regulationfree entrysocially optimal entry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (9)

Oligopoly with network effects: firm-specific versus single network ⋮ Cost uncertainty in an oligopoly with endogenous entry ⋮ On the welfare effects of adverse selection in oligopolistic markets ⋮ The more the merrier? On the optimality of market size restrictions ⋮ Social efficiency of entry in a vertical structure with third degree price discrimination ⋮ Entry and mergers in oligopoly with firm-specific network effects ⋮ Entry and social efficiency under Bertrand competition and asymmetric information ⋮ Strategic corporate social responsibility, imperfect competition, and market concentration ⋮ Price caps, oligopoly, and entry

Cites Work

• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
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• Strict monotonicity in comparative statics
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• Sensitivity analysis of multisector optimal economic dynamics
• Cournot oligopoly and the theory of supermodular games
• Cournot games with biconcave demand
• A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
• On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Entry Barriers and Economic Welfare
• Flexible Functional Forms and Global Curvature Conditions
• Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets
• Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and the Correspondence Principle
• Cournot Oligopoly and Competitive Behaviour

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