Community enforcement with observation costs

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.007zbMath1309.91015OpenAlexW2016190513MaRDI QIDQ472190

Yu Awaya

Publication date: 19 November 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.007

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamerandom matchingcommunity enforcementobservation cost

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites Work

• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
• Repeated games with voluntary information purchase
• Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
• The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching