On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.09.016zbMath1309.91012OpenAlexW2122325130MaRDI QIDQ472191

Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme

Publication date: 19 November 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11336/5802

zbMATH Keywords

corecompetitive equilibriumassignment gameset-wise stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Discrete location and assignment (90B80)

Related Items (3)

Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games ⋮ A survey on assignment markets ⋮ A note on submodularity preserved involving the rank functions

Cites Work

• A generalized assignment game
• Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
• The epsilon core of a large replica game
• Cores of partitioning games
• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
• The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria
• The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
• Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment
• Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
• The assignment game. I: The core
• On the core of linear production games
• Equivalence of Games and Markets
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
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