Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.006zbMath1309.91050OpenAlexW2040212752WikidataQ109043126 ScholiaQ109043126MaRDI QIDQ472193

Alejandro Saporiti

Publication date: 19 November 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/schools/soss/economics/discussionpapers/EDP-1402.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessrectangularitypartial honestyrepresentative (median) votersecure implementationsingle-crossing preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

On the implementation of the median ⋮ Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies ⋮ On single-peaked domains and min-max rules ⋮ Implementation with a sympathizer ⋮ Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules ⋮ Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals ⋮ Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ A characterization of random min-max domains and its applications ⋮ A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting ⋮ Epistemological implementation of social choice functions ⋮ Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions

Cites Work

• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
• Role of honesty in full implementation