Bargaining with Two-sided Incomplete Information: An Infinite Horizon Model with Alternating Offers

DOI10.2307/2297510zbMath0615.90098OpenAlexW2031621439MaRDI QIDQ4724441

Larry Samuelson, Kalyan Chatterjee

Publication date: 1987

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297510

zbMATH Keywords

tradeNash equilibriumsequential equilibriumtwo-sided incomplete informationinfinite-horizon bargaining modelsoft player

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (21)

A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: verifiable types ⋮ Endogeneity of alternating offers in a bargaining game ⋮ Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs ⋮ The war of attrition with incomplete information ⋮ Building reputation in a war of attrition game: hawkish or dovish stance? ⋮ Bilateral trading and incomplete information: price convergence in a small market ⋮ Bargaining with evolving private information ⋮ Breakdown in multilateral negotiations ⋮ Bargaining under almost complete information ⋮ Bargaining, search, and outside options ⋮ Resource inequality in the war of attrition ⋮ Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining. ⋮ Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication. ⋮ Equity bargaining with common value ⋮ Reputation Effects ⋮ Alternating-offers bargaining in one-to-many and many-to-many settings ⋮ A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels ⋮ Bargaining or searching for a better price? An experimental study ⋮ Forward Commodity Trading with Private Information ⋮ The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types ⋮ Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining

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