The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4724442
DOI10.2307/1911307zbMath0615.90099OpenAlexW2768978272WikidataQ56505356 ScholiaQ56505356MaRDI QIDQ4724442
Drew Fudenberg, Eric S. Maskin
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/742f32c5b4f034962aeb090b3d61ced186bea06f
sequential equilibriumperfect equilibriumfull dimensionalityindividually rational payoff vectorinfinitely-repeated gameone-shot game of complete information
Related Items (only showing first 100 items - show all)
A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games ⋮ The survival of inefficient and efficient norms: Equilibria with and without meta-norms in a repeated norm enforcing game ⋮ Statistical physics of human cooperation ⋮ Equilibrium payoffs of dynamic games ⋮ Existence and local stability of Pareto superior reaction function equilibria in discounted supergames ⋮ On Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Hierarchical Games ⋮ Social norms and choice: a weak folk theorem for repeated matching games ⋮ Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information ⋮ On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games ⋮ Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games ⋮ Renegotiation in the repeated Cournot model ⋮ Equilibrium vengeance ⋮ Strong Strategic Support of Cooperation in Multistage Games ⋮ Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring ⋮ Hamilton's rule ⋮ The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Time-Dependent Discounting ⋮ FORWARD-LOOKING PRINCIPLE IN REPEATED GAMES ⋮ Why is civil conflict path dependent? A cultural explanation ⋮ What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs ⋮ Pricing strategy and collusion in a market with delay sensitivity ⋮ Foundation of quantum optimal transport and applications ⋮ Cooperative teaching and learning of actions ⋮ MORAL HAZARD IN REMOTE TEAMS ⋮ The folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma with endogenous private monitoring ⋮ Decentralized update selection with semi-strategic experts ⋮ The analogical foundations of cooperation ⋮ Direct reciprocity in structured populations ⋮ Bad apples in symmetric repeated games ⋮ Stability in repeated matching markets ⋮ The Weighted Set Covering Game: A Vaccine Pricing Model for Pediatric Immunization ⋮ Strongly Time-Consistent Solutions in Cooperative Dynamic Games ⋮ Memory-two strategies forming symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibrium in repeated prisoners' dilemma game ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags ⋮ Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication ⋮ Private ordering: A comparative institutional analysis of hostage games* ⋮ Pareto efficiency, simple game stability, and social structure in finitely repeated games ⋮ Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient ⋮ Dynamic Games with an Application to Climate Change Models ⋮ Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ Repeated Games with Incomplete Information ⋮ Stochastic Games ⋮ Repeated games with present-biased preferences ⋮ The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs ⋮ Gains, losses, and cooperation in social dilemmas and collective action: The effects of risk preferences ⋮ Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria ⋮ FORMALIZATION OF MULTI-LEVEL GAMES ⋮ FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS IN DISCOUNTED SUPERGAMES ⋮ Introducing to the evolution of preferences ⋮ Preference evolution and reciprocity ⋮ A strong anti-folk theorem ⋮ Marginal costs and collusive sustainability ⋮ Cooperation and computability in \(n\)-player games ⋮ Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games ⋮ The truth behind the myth of the folk theorem ⋮ Barro-Gordon revisited: Reputational equilibria with inferential expectations ⋮ Coordination need not be a problem ⋮ Social norms and trust among strangers ⋮ A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting ⋮ Negotiation games with unobservable mixed disagreement actions ⋮ The endgame ⋮ Asymmetrical expectations of future interaction and cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Cooperation in the commons ⋮ Finitely repeated games: a generalized Nash folk theorem ⋮ Construction of a strong Nash equilibrium in a class of infinite nonzero-sum games ⋮ Community enforcement using modal actions ⋮ Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Myopic perception in repeated games ⋮ Whether to attack a terrorist's resource stock today or tomorrow ⋮ Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games ⋮ Interplay between Security Providers, Consumers, and Attackers: A Weighted Congestion Game Approach ⋮ Bayesian Decision Making in Groups is Hard ⋮ Asynchronous games with transfers: uniqueness and optimality ⋮ Defensive Plays in Repeated Games ⋮ Inefficiency in alternately repeated games with overlapping generations ⋮ Repeated Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: The Stackleberg Variant ⋮ Perturbed finitely repeated games ⋮ REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING ⋮ Embedding Trust: A Game-Theoretic Model for Investments in and Returns on Network Embeddedness ⋮ The role of commitment in repeated games ⋮ Governments Playing Games and Combating the Dynamics of a Terrorist Organization ⋮ A folk theorem for stochastic games with finite horizon ⋮ Justifiable punishments in repeated games ⋮ COOPERATION, COLLECTIVES FORMATION AND SPECIALIZATION ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions ⋮ Bounded memory folk theorem ⋮ The chain-store paradox revisited ⋮ Evolving cooperation ⋮ Dark matters: exploitation as cooperation ⋮ Impact of density and interconnectedness of influential players on social welfare ⋮ Group-separations based on the repeated prisoners' dilemma games ⋮ How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games? ⋮ When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? ⋮ A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring ⋮ Social norms, cooperation and inequality ⋮ A robust resolution of Newcomb's paradox ⋮ Order of limits in reputations ⋮ Reputation in repeated second-price auctions ⋮ Private monitoring in auctions ⋮ Repeated Downsian electoral competition
This page was built for publication: The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
