Moral Hazard and Limited Liability: Implications for the Theory of the Firm

DOI10.2307/2526754zbMath0681.90012OpenAlexW2090617951MaRDI QIDQ4730983

Barbara J. Spencer, James A. Brander

Publication date: 1989

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526754

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot oligopolytheory of the firmmoral hazardmonopolypure competitionfirm's optimal financial structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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