Collective Choice Rules without the Pareto Principle

DOI10.2307/2526439zbMath0508.90006OpenAlexW2014894862MaRDI QIDQ4747858

Kotaro Suzumura, John Fountain

Publication date: 1982

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526439

zbMATH Keywords

positive responsivenessoligarchy theoremindependancedictator theoremArrows impossibility theoreminterval order rationalitysemi-transitive rationalityweakened full rationalitywithout Pareto principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (10)

Hierarchical voting ⋮ Weak independence and the Pareto principle ⋮ Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle ⋮ Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization ⋮ A generalization of Campbell and Kelly's trade-off theorem ⋮ A note on Murakami's theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle ⋮ Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis ⋮ Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems ⋮ Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions ⋮ An oligarchy theorem in fixed agenda without Pareto conditions

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