Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information

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Publication:4747943

DOI10.2307/2297414zbMath0508.90094OpenAlexW2051748453MaRDI QIDQ4747943

Jean Tirole, Drew Fudenberg

Publication date: 1983

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297414




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