Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served?

DOI10.1007/S10479-010-0815-XzbMath1301.91034OpenAlexW2105520423MaRDI QIDQ475281

Michael Finus, Bianca Rundshagen, Johan Eyckmans

Publication date: 26 November 2014

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://opus.bath.ac.uk/28547/1/SMUG_v01102010_final_submission.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

integrated assessment modelinternational climate agreementssequential coalition formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (4)

Impact of equity and equality on stability and collusion in a decentralized network ⋮ Who pays the bill? Climate change, taxes, and transfers in a multi-region growth model ⋮ Likelihood of environmental coalitions and the number of coalition members: evidences from an IAM model ⋮ Solution algorithms for regional interactions in large-scale integrated assessment models of climate change

Cites Work

• Decomposing the integrated assessment of climate change
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Stable international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant, uncertainty and learning
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
• Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries
• COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING
• PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF TIMING AND REGULATION
• A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining

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