Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay
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Publication:475303
DOI10.1007/s10479-011-1018-9zbMath1301.91031OpenAlexW3124844972MaRDI QIDQ475303
Pierre Courtois, Tarik Tazdaït
Publication date: 26 November 2014
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-011-1018-9
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)
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