International environmental cooperation: a new eye on the greenhouse gas emissions' control

DOI10.1007/S10479-012-1156-8zbMath1301.91035OpenAlexW1967823079MaRDI QIDQ475308

Mélanie Heugues

Publication date: 26 November 2014

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-012-1156-8

zbMATH Keywords

climate changestrategic complementaritiesinternational environmental agreementsnoncooperative game theoryglobal environmental problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

The two-stage game approach to coalition formation: where we stand and ways to go ⋮ Technology adoption with carbon emission trading mechanism: modeling with heterogeneous agents and uncertain carbon price

Cites Work

• Cost-effective environmental policy: implications of induced technological change
• Free trade and global warming: a trade theory view of the Kyoto protocol

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