Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games

DOI10.1007/s00199-014-0846-7zbMath1319.91020OpenAlexW2261338879MaRDI QIDQ476147

Jan-Philip Gamp, Sonja Brangewitz

Publication date: 28 November 2014

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2902163

zbMATH Keywords

market gamescompetitive payoffsinner coreNTU games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items

Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games ⋮ The Nonemptiness of the Inner Core

Cites Work

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