The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information

DOI10.1007/S00199-014-0847-6zbMath1319.91084OpenAlexW2009499313MaRDI QIDQ476152

Iryna Topolyan, David A. Malueg, Stefano Barbieri

Publication date: 28 November 2014

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0847-6

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctionfree-ridingprivate provision of public goodsgroup contestgroup-size paradoxvolunteer's dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (13)

Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction ⋮ Simple equilibria in general contests ⋮ Group formation in a dominance-seeking contest ⋮ Contests between two groups for a group-specific public-good/bad prize ⋮ Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles ⋮ Correlated play in weakest-link and best-shot group contests ⋮ An analysis of group contests with the possibility of a draw ⋮ Contests with multiple alternative prizes: public-good/bad prizes and externalities ⋮ A simple model of competition between teams ⋮ Group contests with private information and the ``weakest link ⋮ Private-information group contests: best-shot competition ⋮ Risk preference heterogeneity in group contests ⋮ Sharing the effort costs in group contests

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Effort levels in contests. The public-good prize case
• A simple game-theoretic explanation for the relationship between group size and helping
• Auctions with interdependent valuations
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Rent-seeking for a public good with additive contributions
• Group efforts when performance is determined by the ``best shot
• Extremism drives out moderation
• The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities
• Simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts
• Contests with group-specific public-good prizes
• All-Pay Contests

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