Bounding the payment of approximate truthful mechanisms
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Publication:476890
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2014.10.019zbMath1303.68153OpenAlexW2046744707MaRDI QIDQ476890
Publication date: 2 December 2014
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2014.10.019
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Combinatorial aspects of packing and covering (05B40)
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