Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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Publication:4773465
DOI10.2307/1914033zbMath0286.90008OpenAlexW2047294939WikidataQ56169495 ScholiaQ56169495MaRDI QIDQ4773465
Publication date: 1973
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1914033
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