Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences

DOI10.1016/j.dam.2014.07.003zbMath1303.91123OpenAlexW3125146094MaRDI QIDQ477355

Yusuke Narita, John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima

Publication date: 3 December 2014

Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2014.07.003

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicitystabilityPareto efficiencystrategy-proofnessmany-to-many two-sided matchingmax-min preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (9)

Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach ⋮ A one-sided many-to-many matching problem ⋮ Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand ⋮ The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences ⋮ The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings ⋮ A note on many-to-many matchings and stable allocations ⋮ Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand ⋮ The stable \(b\)-matching polytope revisited ⋮ Efficiency and stability in a process of teams formation

Cites Work

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• Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
• Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
• Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
• When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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