Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2014.09.001zbMath1331.91133OpenAlexW1986270727MaRDI QIDQ477777

Takashi Akahoshi

Publication date: 9 December 2014

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.09.001

zbMATH Keywords

acyclicitystable matchingcolleges preference relations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: acyclicity and dropping strategies

Cites Work

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• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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