Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00211zbMath1025.91008OpenAlexW2114415375MaRDI QIDQ4789811

Publication date: 26 November 2003

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00211

zbMATH Keywords

auctions collusive equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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