A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00214zbMath1030.91008MaRDI QIDQ4789814

Quan Wen

Publication date: 14 April 2003

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gamesperfect equilibriumFolk theoremeffective minimaxrepeated sequential games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Dynamic moral hazard without commitment ⋮ Macro meets micro: stochastic (Calvo) revisions in games ⋮ On asynchronously repeated games ⋮ The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing ⋮ A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model ⋮ Maintenance in single-server queues: a game-theoretic approach ⋮ Coordination need not be a problem ⋮ Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games ⋮ Repeated Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: The Stackleberg Variant ⋮ Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information