Holdup and the evolution of bargaining conventions

DOI10.1051/EJESS:2001102zbMath1029.91023OpenAlexW3123008548MaRDI QIDQ4796428

W. Bentley MacLeod, Herbert Dawid

Publication date: 10 February 2004

Published in: European Journal of Economic and Social Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1051/ejess:2001102

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriaallocation of resourcesabsence of lawnorms of behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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