Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00095zbMath1055.91530OpenAlexW2161401558MaRDI QIDQ4799853

Stefan Krasa, Anne P. Villamil

Publication date: 2000

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00095

zbMATH Keywords

limited commitmenttime consistencyrenegotiationcostly state verificationstochastic monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (27)

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