Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00052zbMath1055.91531OpenAlexW2138595148WikidataQ55881485 ScholiaQ55881485MaRDI QIDQ4799858

Jean Tirole

Publication date: 1999

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00052

zbMATH Keywords

transaction costsunforeseen contingenciesauthority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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