A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods
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Publication:4799864
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00028zbMath1049.91502OpenAlexW2105866961MaRDI QIDQ4799864
Thomas R. Palfrey, John O. Ledyard
Publication date: 1999
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-164134782
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