ASSESSING THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT OF MERGERS FOR MARKET POWER

DOI10.1142/S021919890200080XzbMath1058.91055MaRDI QIDQ4808012

Ramon Faulí-Oller

Publication date: 16 December 2003

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

welfareAntitrust

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Cites Work

• On merger profitability in a Cournot setting
• On the competitive effects of divisionalization
• On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
• On the Effects of Entry
• On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets

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