ON THE SURVIVAL OF COOPERATION UNDER DIFFERENT MATCHING SCHEMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198902000811zbMath1049.91114MaRDI QIDQ4808013

Nicolas Jonard

Publication date: 2002

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

viscosityassortative matchingCooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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• The Evolution of Conventions