Voting power and proportional representation of voters

DOI10.1007/s00182-013-0400-zzbMath1308.91050OpenAlexW2051198652MaRDI QIDQ480840

Artyom Jelnov, Yair Tauman

Publication date: 12 December 2014

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/economics/research/papers/2012/Jelnov-Tauman.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley-Shubik indexvoting powerproportional representationvoting systemsBanzhaf index

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items

Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule ⋮ On weights and quotas for weighted majority voting games ⋮ The geometry of voting power: weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids ⋮ Analyzing power in weighted voting games with super-increasing weights ⋮ Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with an Application to False-name Manipulation ⋮ Average weights and power in weighted voting games

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