Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals

DOI10.1007/s00182-013-0405-7zbMath1308.91068OpenAlexW2124648551MaRDI QIDQ480844

Ella Segev, Ron Lavi

Publication date: 12 December 2014

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0405-7

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic arrivalssequential ascending auctionsundominated strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Reserve prices in repeated auctions

Cites Work

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• The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism
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• Coarse Matching

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