Non-existence of subgame-perfect \(\varepsilon \)-equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon

DOI10.1007/s00182-014-0412-3zbMath1304.91031OpenAlexW2074754903MaRDI QIDQ480860

Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi, Gijs Schoenmakers, Eilon Solan, Eran Shmaya, Jeroen Kuipers, Janos Flesch

Publication date: 12 December 2014

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0412-3

zbMATH Keywords

infinite horizonnon-existencesubgame-perfect equilibriumperfect-information games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (14)

Subgame-perfection in recursive perfect information games, where each player controls one state ⋮ Subgame-perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibria in perfect information games with sigma-discrete discontinuities ⋮ Individual upper semicontinuity and subgame perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibria in games with almost perfect information ⋮ On refinements of subgame perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibrium ⋮ Symmetry and approximate equilibria in games with countably many players ⋮ Parameterized games of perfect information ⋮ Equilibrium in two-player stochastic games with shift-invariant payoffs ⋮ Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games ⋮ Stochastic Games ⋮ Perfect information games where each player acts only once ⋮ Approximated cooperative equilibria for games played over event trees ⋮ Subgame-Perfect ϵ-Equilibria in Perfect Information Games with Common Preferences at the Limit ⋮ Correlated equilibria in stochastic games with Borel measurable payoffs ⋮ Subgame-perfection in free transition games

Cites Work

• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games.
• \(\epsilon\)-consistent equilibrium in repeated games.
• Perfect Information Games with Upper Semicontinuous Payoffs
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Perfect-Information Games with Lower-Semicontinuous Payoffs
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Unnamed Item

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