The stationary equilibrium of three-person coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: a classification

DOI10.1007/s00182-014-0413-2zbMath1304.91025OpenAlexW2032225442MaRDI QIDQ480861

Akira Okada

Publication date: 12 December 2014

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0413-2

zbMATH Keywords

corecoalitional gamenoncooperative bargainingthree-person gamemarginal contributionrandom proposer

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Cites Work

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• The Nash bargaining solution in general \(n\)-person cooperative games
• Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: theory and application
• Noncooperative selection of the core
• Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel.
• Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
• A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
• The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution
• A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation
• THE AGENCIES METHOD FOR MODELING COALITIONS AND COOPERATION IN GAMES

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