Selective revelation of public information and self-confirming equilibrium

DOI10.1007/S00182-014-0415-0zbMath1304.91032OpenAlexW2081791973MaRDI QIDQ480865

Zacharias Maniadis

Publication date: 12 December 2014

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0415-0

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium refinementself-confirming equilibriummanipulationbelief-based learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Learning mixed equilibria
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history: A re-examination
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
• Expectations and fairness in a simple bargaining experiment
• Manipulative auction design
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Selective revelation of public information and self-confirming equilibrium