Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4810821
DOI10.1111/0034-6527.00273zbMath1073.91026OpenAlexW3124790616MaRDI QIDQ4810821
Leandro Arozamena, Estelle Cantillon
Publication date: 16 August 2004
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/9005/1/ce-0004.pdf
Related Items (19)
Procurement Mechanisms with Post-Auction Pre-Award Cost-Reduction Investigations ⋮ Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers ⋮ Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions ⋮ VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities ⋮ Efficient investments in the implementation problem ⋮ On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments ⋮ Real options with unknown-date events ⋮ Investment incentives in bilateral trading ⋮ Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests ⋮ Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions ⋮ Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions ⋮ The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions ⋮ Multidimensional private value auctions ⋮ First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model ⋮ First-price auction implements efficient investments ⋮ Uniform price auctions with a last accepted bid pricing rule ⋮ Biased procurement auctions ⋮ Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders
This page was built for publication: Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
