Voting on Majority Rules

DOI10.1111/0034-6527.00278zbMath1066.91023OpenAlexW2063156741MaRDI QIDQ4810826

Mattias K. Polborn, Matthias Messner

Publication date: 16 August 2004

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00278

zbMATH Keywords

overlapping generations modelsupermajority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (10)

The legislative calendar ⋮ Optimal majority rule in referenda ⋮ Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise ⋮ Ideology and endogenous constitutions ⋮ Endogenous institutions and political extremism ⋮ Critical decisions and constitutional rules ⋮ Flexibility vs. protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority ⋮ Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations ⋮ The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule ⋮ Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions

This page was built for publication: Voting on Majority Rules