Committee Design with Endogenous Information
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Publication:4810828
DOI10.1111/0034-6527.00280zbMath1106.91026OpenAlexW2131858815MaRDI QIDQ4810828
Publication date: 16 August 2004
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00280
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