Legal enforcement, default and heterogeneity of project-financing contracts

DOI10.1007/S10436-014-0256-7zbMath1319.91153OpenAlexW2026783695MaRDI QIDQ481382

Gabriel A. Madeira

Publication date: 12 December 2014

Published in: Annals of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.repec.eae.fea.usp.br/documentos/GabrielMadeira_31WP.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

interest ratesinvestmentmechanism designcredit constraintslegal enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Credit risk (91G40) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Bankruptcy and firm finance
• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• The effects of credit subsidies on development
• The Distributive Impact of Reforms in Credit Enforcement: Evidence From Indian Debt Recovery Tribunals
• Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements
• Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
• Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
• Enterprise, Inequality and Economic Development

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