Please, Marry Me! An Experimental Study of Risking a Joint Venture

DOI10.1111/J.0026-1386.2004.00179.XzbMath1108.91314OpenAlexW3126006273MaRDI QIDQ4814170

Sigve Tjøtta, Güth, Werner, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel

Publication date: 7 September 2004

Published in: Metroeconomica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/61707

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games
• Anonymity versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining
• Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm

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