Public-Good Provision with Many Participants

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00257zbMath1104.91301OpenAlexW2099107855MaRDI QIDQ4817921

Martin F. Hellwig

Publication date: 21 September 2004

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00257

zbMATH Keywords

individual rationalityisoelasticsecond-best allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (14)

Mechanism design and intentions ⋮ A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments ⋮ Efficient compromising ⋮ Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents ⋮ One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing ⋮ Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: a possibility theorem ⋮ Proportional individual rationality and the provision of a public good in a large economy ⋮ Toward an efficiency rationale for the public provision of private goods ⋮ Public goods with congestion ⋮ Optimal provision of a public good with costly exclusion ⋮ All or nothing: state capacity and optimal public goods provision ⋮ On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms ⋮ On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities ⋮ To sell public or private goods

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