Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00260zbMath1104.91056OpenAlexW3122448459MaRDI QIDQ4817924

Anne C. Sibert

Publication date: 21 September 2004

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00260

zbMATH Keywords

social welfareinflationary toughness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (8)

Voting in the limelight ⋮ Revealed votes ⋮ Designing monetary policy committees ⋮ Optimal conservatism and collective monetary policymaking under uncertainty ⋮ Information acquisition and transparency in committees ⋮ Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published? ⋮ Committees, sequential voting and transparency ⋮ Committees with leaks

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